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Nontechnical Summary:
The different tax, expenditure and regulatory functions of government typically vary
considerably in their degree of decentralization, and moreover, decentralization also varies
considerably by country, as well as by function. There is also an old and continuing debate over
the desirable degree of decentralization. For example, the principle of subsidiarity in the
Maastricht treaty, is the subject of continuing controversy. This paper addresses both these
issues.
The earlier literature on fiscal federalism, and in particular Oates' seminal work (Oates (1972))
gave the following account of costs and benefits of decentralization. Sub-central governments
may find it hard to coordinate to internalize inter-jurisdictional externalities, or to exploit
economies of scale, in the provision of regional projects. On the other hand, the benefit of
decentralization is greater responsiveness in the choice of project to the preferences of regions
and localities. Specifically, in Oates' work, the cost of centralization was assumed to be policy
uniformity e.g. if a regional public good is provided centrally, it must be provided at the same
level in every region. This leads to the conclusion (Oates' “decentralization theorem''), that the
efficient level of decentralization of the provision of a public good (or indeed any other
government activity) is at the point where the benefits from less policy uniformity no longer
exceed the costs of less internalization of externalities.
While providing important insights, Oates' account suffers from the problem that “policy
uniformity'' is not derived from any explicit model of government behavior, and indeed, explicit
public choice models tend to give a different account of what might happen with centralized
provision of regional public goods. For example, the large literature on distributive politics (see
Mueller (1997)) emphasizes the formation of minimum winning coalitions, rather than policy
uniformity, in the provision of projects with region-specific benefits.
However, the distributive politics literature cannot be applied directly to refine Oates' argument,
as it does not model the benefits of centralization that arise from the internalization of
externalities. This paper attempts to integrate these two literatures, by formulating a model of
distributive policy where (i) legislative behavior is rigorously modeled, with the primitives being
legislative rules, rather than outcomes; (ii) spillovers between regions generated by distributive
policies gives some rationale for centralization.
Absent externalities, the specific model we use is in many respects standard in the large
theoretical literature with distributive politics. Specifically, every region has a discrete project
which generates both intra-regional benefits and external benefits (or costs). All voters within a
region are identical, but regions may vary both with respect to the costs and the benefit of the
project. Central government then comprises a legislature of delegates, each delegate representing
a region, and elected from amongst the citizens of that region. The legislature then decides on
which projects are to be financed out of the proceeds of a uniform national tax.
Building on the important papers by Ferejohn, Fiorina, McKelvey(1987), and McKelvey(1986),
we then propose some minimal legislative rules to ensure that behavior in the legislature is
determinate (i.e. that voting cycles are ruled out). First, legislators make proposals concerning
subsets of regions whose projects are to be funded. These proposals are then ordered into an
agenda, and are voted on sequentially, and the winning motion is then paired with the
status quo.
This procedure has a unique equilibrium outcome, where a proposal to fund projects in a
particular set K of regions is proposed and approved, independently of how items are ordered on
the agenda. If externalities are negative, or only weakly positive, this set comprises a simple
majority of regions with the lowest costs as in the distributive politics literature (Ferejohn,
Fiorina, McKelvey (1987)). If externalities are strongly positive, K comprises more than a
simple majority of regions, and may include all regions.
So, an important insight of this paper is that there is an interaction between project externalities
and the legislative rules; the strength of the spillovers affects the degree of ``universalism'' or
uniformity in distributive policy. When spillovers are strong (and positive), outcome of
legislative decision-making is closer to uniformity than it is when spillovers are small, or
negative.
The second contribution of the paper is a thorough investigation of the constitutional choice
between centralization and decentralization, using this model as a vehicle. We study first the
benchmark case, where unanimity is required for any change to the status quo, but side-payments
between regions are possible. This case is a useful benchmark, in that the efficient alternative
that maximizes aggregate welfare (the sum of utilities) will be chosen. We also consider the
alternatives of unanimity rule without side-payments, and majority rule. Generally, the picture
confirms Oates' insights; centralization is chosen when externalities are strong and regions are
relatively homogenous, and decentralization is chosen when the converse is true. But, there are
some intriguing exceptions. For example, the relative benefit to centralization is not everywhere
increasing in the size of the externality. These exceptions result from the fact that the legislative
outcome is endogenously determined by the size of the externality.
1. Introduction
The dierent tax, expenditure and regulatory functions of government typically
vary considerably in their degree of decentralization. For example, in the US,
expenditure on education is highly decentralized, while expenditure on defense is
almost entirely federal; property taxes are the main revenue-raising instrument at
local level, whereas state and federal governments use income taxes. Moreover,
countries dier in the degree to which functions are decentralized; for example, in
contrast to the US, the only tax which is not centrally set in the UK is the local
residential property tax.
Moreover, there is both an old and continuing debate over the desirable de-
gree of decentralization. For example, there has been an ongoing debate about the
appropriate sharing of tax and expenditure powers between Federal and State gov-
ernments since the drafting of the US Constitution (Inman and Rubinfeld(1997)).
In the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity, in introduced in the Maas-
tricht Treaty, remains vague and capable of conicting interpretations (Begg et.
al. (1993)).
To understand this empirical diversity, and also to address the normative ques-
tions, we must understand both the underlying costs and benets of (de)centralization,
and the political processes that lead to the choice of a particular level of decen-
tralization being chosen.
The earlier literature on scal federalism, and in particular Oates' seminal
work (Oates(1972)) gave the following account of costs and benets of decentral-
ization. Sub-central governments may nd it hard to coordinate to internalize
inter-jurisdictional externalities, or to exploit economies of scale, in the provision
of regional projects. On the other hand, the benet of decentralization is greater
responsiveness in the choice of project to the preferences of regions and locali-
ties. Specically, in Oates' work, the cost of centralization was assumed to be
policy uniformity i.e. it was assumed that if a regional public good was provided
centrally, it must be provided at the same level in every region. This leads to
the conclusion (Oates' decentralization theorem), that the ecient level of de-
centralization of the provision of a public good (or indeed any other government
activity) is at the point where the benets from less policy uniformity no longer
exceed the costs of less internalization of externalities.
While providing important insights, Oates' account suers from two problems.
First, typically, spending by central governments is not uniform across regions in
per capita terms. For example, the formulae used to allocate US grants-in-aid
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depends not only on population, but also on income per capita, tax raising eort,
and several other factors (Boadway and Wildasin(1984)).
Second, the hypothesis of policy uniformity is not derived from any explicit
model of government behaviour, and indeed, explicit public choice models tend
to give a dierent account of what might happen with centralized provision of
regional public goods. For example, the large literature on distributive politics
(see e.g. Ferejohn, Fiorina and McKelvey (1987)) emphasizes the formation of
minimum winning coalitions, rather than policy uniformity, in the provision of
projects with region-specic benets.
However, the distributive politics literature cannot be applied directly to rene
Oates' argument, as it does not model the benets of centralization that arise
from the internalization of externalities. This paper attempts to integrate these
two literatures, by formulating a model of distributive policy where (i) legislative
behaviour is rigorously modelled, with the primitives being legislative rules, rather
than outcomes; (ii) spillovers between regions generated by distributive policies
gives some rationale for centralization.
The main insight of this paper is that there is an interaction between these
two features; the strength of the spillovers aects the degree of universalism
or uniformity in distributive policy. When spillovers are strong (and positive),
the outcome of legislative decision-making is closer to uniformity than it is when
spillovers are small, or negative.
Absent externalities, the specic model we use is in many respects standard in
the large theoretical literature with distributive politics. Specically, every region
has a discrete project which generates both intra-regional benets and external
benets (or costs). All voters within a region are identical, but regions may vary
both with respect to the costs and the benet of the project. Central government
then comprises a legislature of delegates, each delegate representing a region, and
elected from amongst the citizens of that region
1
. The legislature then decides on
which projects are to be nanced out of the proceeds of a uniform national tax.
Building on the important papers by Ferejohn, Fiorina, McKelvey(1987), and
McKelvey(1986), we then propose some minimal legislative rules to ensure that
behaviour in the legislature is determinate. First, legislators make proposals con-
cerning subsets of regions whose projects are to be funded. These proposals are
then ordered into an agenda, and are voted on sequentially, and the winning
1
Another new feature is that of election of delegates to the national legislature. As all regions
are homogenous, however, the delegate must have the preferences of any resident of that region.
Besley and Coate(1998) consider the case where intra-regional preferences may dier.
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motion is then paired with the status quo.
This procedure has a unique equilibrium outcome, where a proposal to fund
projects in a particular set K of regions is proposed and approved, independently
of how items are ordered on the agenda. The key nding is the following. If
externalities are negative, or only weakly positive, this set comprises a bare ma-
jority of regions
2
with the lowest costs as in the distributive politics literature
(Ferejohn, Fiorina, McKelvey(1987)). If externalities are strongly positive, K
comprises more than a bare majority of regions, and may include all regions. So,
the level of the externality helps determine the degree of uniformity in project
provision.
The second contribution of the paper is a thorough investigation of the con-
stitutional choice between centralization and decentralization, using this model
as a vehicle. We study rst the benchmark case, where unanimity is required
for any change to the status quo, but side-payments between regions are possible.
This case is a useful benchmark, in that the ecient alternative that maximises
aggregate welfare (the sum of utilities) will be chosen. We also consider the al-
ternatives of unanimity rule and majority rule without side-payments. Generally,
the picture conrms Oates' insights; centralization is chosen when externalities
are strong and regions are relatively homogenous, and decentralization is chosen
when the converse is true. But, there are some intriguing exceptions. For ex-
ample, the relative benet to centralization is not everywhere increasing in the
size of the externality. These exceptions result from the fact that the legislative
outcome is endogenously determined, in part by the size of the externality.
There is already a body of work
3
which addresses (explicitly or implicitly
4
)
the choice between centralization and decentralization, while taking a political
2
That is, m = (n+ 1)=2 regions, where n is the (odd) number of regions.
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One should also note the work of Edwards and Keen(1996), and Seabright(1996)), where
government is modelled as a Leviathan. The problem with such models of government behaviour,
however, is that they are not based explicitly on the primitives of voters, legislative rules and the
principal-agent relationship between voters and bureaucrats. There are also a number of papers
which model government as welfare-maximizing (see e.g. Caillaud, Gilbert and Picard(1996),
Gilbert and Picard(1996), Klibano and Poitevin(1996), Seabright(1996)). The challenge for
these papers is to explain why decentralization might ever be welfare-superior to centralization;
if central government can precommit, it can always replicate the decentralised outcome.
4
Bolton and Roland focus on the closely related issue of when regions might choose to secede
from a federation. One of the main themes of Bolton and Roland's work is how policy might
be designed by the federation (assuming uniformity), subject to the constraint that it is not in
either region's interest to secede. In our paper, we abstract from these issues by (implicitly)
assuming that secession is innitely costly.
4
economy approach to the modelling of government behavior (Alesina and Spo-
lare(1997), Bolton and Roland(1997), Cremer and Palfrey(1996), Ellingsen(1997)).
However, with the exception of Ellingsen, this literature follows Oates in assuming
that centralized provision of a public good is uniform.
Finally, there is independent contribution of Besley and Coate(1998), seen
only after the rst draft of this paper was completed. Their paper also reexam-
ines Oates' decentralization theorem from a political economy perspective. The
focus of Besley and Coate's paper, however, is really quite dierent; they explicitly
model the election of delegates to the national legislature in a citizen-candidate
setting, and how this process interacts with the behaviour of the legislature. By
contrast to this paper, theirs does not model all the rules of operation of the
legislature explicitly. Rather, in the setting of a one-shot version of Baron and
Ferejohn's model of legislative bargaining, they capture the degree of universalis-
m in an ad hoc way by supposing that the agenda-setter places some (exogenous)
weight on the utility of the other delegate when formulating his agenda.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 exposits the model.
Sections 3 and 4 analyse political equilibrium under centralization. Section 5 con-
siders issues of constitutional design, and derives conditions under which central-
ization or decentralization is the more ecient. Section 6 considers the robustness
of the results to various extensions of the model. Section 7 discusses some related
literature in more detail than above, and concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Preliminaries
There are an odd number i = 1; ::n of regions or districts each populated by a
number of identical individuals with a population size normalized to unity. In
each district there is a discrete project x
i
2 f0; 1g. Each project has a resource
cost c
i
, and generates benet b
i
for residents of i, and also external benets e for
residents of all regions j 6= i: There are two ways of interpreting this externality.
The rst is if there are three contiguous regions located in two-dimensional space,
in which case the externality is local i.e. a project only impacts on neighboring
regions, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 in here
The second is that the externality is global, that is, the project aects all
regions, whether neighboring or not. Also, the externality e may be positive or
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negative, and may be interpreted as technological or pecuniary. This is a very
stylized way of modelling externalities, but is analytically convenient. Some of the
results of this paper extend to the case with n > 3 regions and local externalities
(Lockwood(1998)).
The following notation will be useful. Let x = (x
i
)
i2N
be any vector of projects,
and X = f0; 1g
n
be the feasible set of project vectors. If F = fi 2 N jx
i
= 1g is
the set of regions that have funded projects, let
x
F
i
=

1 if i 2 F
0 otherwise
and let x
F
= (x
F
i
)
i2N
. Also, let f = #F:
All residents of region i have identical preferences over x
F
and a numeraire
good of the form
u
i
= b
i
x
F
i
+ y
i
+ (f   x
F
i
)e (2.1)
where b
i
is the benet from the project for those in region i; and y
i
the level of
consumption of a numeraire good. The term (f x
F
i
)e indicates that region i gets
external benet of fe from x
F
if it does not have a project funded, and benet of
(f   1)e from x
F
if it has a project funded.
A resident of region i has initial endowment of the numeraire of unity, and
pays a lump-sum of t
i
either to regional or central government. So, the budget
constraint for residents of region i is y
i
= 1  t
i
. Substituting this constraint into
(2.1), and suppressing the constant of unity, we get
u
i
= b
i
x
F
i
  t
i
+ (f   x
F
i
)e (2.2)
2.2. Decentralization
With decentralization, the cost of the project is funded by a lump-sum regional
tax
5
, so the regional budget constraint is t
i
= x
i
c
i
: Consequently, the net benet
of the project to any resident is b
i
  c
i
.
We make the natural assumption that a decision about the project is made
by majority voting over the alternatives x
i
2 f0; 1g. So, as all agents in a region
are identical, the outcome under decentralization is simply that the project in i
5
This tax could easily be made distortionary, by introducing a factor of production in elastic
supply (e.g. labour), and supposing that the tax is levied on this factor.
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is funded if b
i
 c
i
. For future reference, note that the payo to a resident of i
with decentralization can be written
u
d
i
= maxfb
i
  c
i
; 0g+ (d  x
D
i
)e (2.3)
where D = fi jb
i
 c
i
g is the set of projects funded under decentralization, and
d = #D: Obviously, in the presence of externalities, the outcome with decentral-
ization is not ecient.
2.3. Centralization
We assume that in this case, both the decision about which projects to fund, and
the setting of a tax to fund them, are made by a legislature that comprised of
delegates from all regions. This is the way that centralization is often dened,
but there are of course, two alternative kinds of partial centralization; the rst is
centralized expenditure, where projects are decided upon by central government,
but are funded by regions as in Section 2.2 above, and the second centralized
funding, where projects are decided upon regionally, but funded though a national
tax (these alternatives are discussed in Section 6.2 below).
Revenue is raised by a national lump-sum tax, t i.e. a tax rate that is uniform
across regions
6
. So, the national government budget constraint is
nt =
X
j2C
c
j
(2.4)
where C is the set of projects funded with centralization.
We make the reasonable assumption that the delegate from region i must be
drawn
7
from the (homogenous) population in that region, consistently with the
citizen-candidate model (Besley and Coate(1997)). Combining this with (2.1) and
(2.2), we see that the payo to both any resident of region i and its delegate from
any x
C
is:
u
c
i
= x
C
i
b
i
 
1
n
X
j2C
c
j
+ (c  x
C
i
)e (2.5)
6
This is obviously in contrast to expenditure decisions, which are allowed to be non-uniform.
Empirically, taxes levied by central government are uniform in the sense that rates do not vary
by region; one reason for this convention may be to protect minority regions from expropriation.
7
Of course, if voters in a region had diering preferences over projects, then the choice of
delegate would be non-trivial, and some explicit modelling of the procedure for the selection of
a delegate would be appropriate. This issue is pursued in Besley and Coate(1998).
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where c = #C: This indicates that with centralization, there are two spillovers
at work; the rst is the project spillover, captured by the term (c   x
C
i
)e, and
the second is the cost-sharing spillover, captured by the term
1
n
P
j2C
c
j
: Thus a
project in region j benets i by net amount e  c
j
=n.
The set C of projects is determined by voting in a legislature, as described
in Section 4 below. There, our modelling strategy is to take as given not the
outcome, but the rules of operation of the legislature governing agenda-setting
and voting. A key prior question is whether there exist alternatives x 2 X which
are Condorcet winners, and it is to this issue that we now turn.
3. When Do Condorcet Winners Exist?
Our space of alternatives is multi-dimensional, and so one might conjecture that
in general, no Condorcet winner (CW) will exist in X. In fact, in the special case
of our model without externalities, it is well-known that under weak conditions,
there is no
8
Condorcet winner in X (Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey(1987)).
Our main nding in this section is that the Ferejohn-Fiorina-McKelvey result
generalizes to the case of negative or weakly positive externalities, but that the
case of strongly positive externalities is quite dierent, with a unique CW.
We begin by dening a CW formally. Let the majority voting preference
relation R over pairs (x; y) in X be dened by
xRy () #fi ju
c
i
(x) > u
c
i
(y)g  #fi ju
c
i
(y) > u
c
i
(x)g (3.1)
Then, xRy indicates that x cannot be defeated by y in a majority vote, if voters
who are indierent between x; y abstain. Say
9
that x 2 Y is a Condorcet winner
in Y  X if there exists an x such that xRy, all y 2 Y .
We now make four assumptions. The rst is very weak; it simply says that
each region derives a greater benet from its project than the benet it generates
for any other region;
A0: b
i
> e, i 2 N
8
Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey(1987) also prove a positive result, namely that there is
an x

2 X
n
which beats all y 2 X
n
that beat the status quo, and moreover, that this CW is
the proposal that funds project in a bare majority of regions with the lowest costs. This result
carries over to our model - see Proposition 1(i).
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Also, dene xPy () #fi ju
c
i
(x) > u
c
i
(y)g > #fi ju
c
i
(y) > u
c
i
(x)g. Note that if the Con-
dorcet winner x is unique, then we must have xPy for all y 2 Y; that is, x defeats all y 6= x in
a majority vote.
8
Now w.l.o.g, order the regions by increasing cost. The second assumption is that
no two regions have the same cost i.e.
A1: c
1
< c
2
< ::: < c
n
:
Next, dene M = f1; ::mg, with m = (n + 1)=2; so M is the minimum winning
coalition of regions with lowest costs. So, x
M
is the policy that funds projects
in these regions only. Dene the status quo to be a situation with no project in
any region, described by 0 2 X. Our nal assumption says that all i 2M strictly
prefer x
M
to the status quo 0. Formally;
A2: b
i
 
1
n
P
j2M
c
j
+ (m  1)e > 0; i 2M
The fourth assumption is only needed in a special case, and its role is further
discussed in Example 1 below.
A3: Suppose that c
k+1
=n > e  c
k
=n for some k < m: Let K = f1; ::kg and
L  N with l = #L: If l > n+ k m, then for some S  L=K with #S = m  k;
all i 2 S prefer x
K
to x
L
i.e. b
i
+ (l  1)e 
1
n
P
i2L
c
j
< ke 
1
n
P
i2K
c
j
; i 2 S:
Also, for neater statement of results, dene a number c
n+1
=1. Our result
10
on
the existence of CWs is then the following.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that A0-A2 hold. (i) If e < c
1
=n, then there exists no
Condorcet winner in X: However, x
M
is the unique Condorcet winner in the set of
those alternatives that are not beaten by the status quo, Y = fx 2 X jxR0g: (ii)
If c
k+1
=n > e  c
k
=n for some n  k  m, then x
K
; K = f1; 2; ::kg is the unique
Condorcet winner in X. (iii) If c
k+1
=n > e  c
k
=n for some 1  k < m, and in
addition A3 holds, then x
K
; K = f1; 2; ::kg is the unique Condorcet winner in X.
So, if externalities are negative or weakly positive (e < c
1
=n), our result is a
simple extension of Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey(1987). By contrast, however,
if externalities are strongly positive and large enough (e  c
m
=n), a CW exists.
Moreover, this CW will typically involve funding projects in more than a bare
majority of regions; indeed, if e  c
n
=n, the CW funds projects in all regions
(universalistic provision).
In the intermediate case, (c
m
=n > e  c
1
=n), the picture is more complicated.
Under an additional assumption A3, we have a unique CW, but now projects are
only funded in a minority of regions (and possibly only one!).
10
This and all subsequent results are proved in the Appendix, when proof is required.
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The intuition for these results is as follows. First, when externalities are
negative or only weakly positive (e < c
1
=n), then the proposal x
M
that gives
projects to the minimum winning coalition with lowest costs cannot be a CW, as
it is beaten - for example - by a proposal that only gives a project to the k < m 1
lowest-cost regions. But, any such proposal imposes a net cost on a majority of
regions, and so is then beaten by the status quo.
When externalities are strongly positive (e  c
m
=n), this intransitivity is
avoided, as even regions that do not get projects prefer x
M
to some proposal
that gives projects to fewer regions: In the intermediate case, the reasoning is
more subtle. In the standard case with e = 0, any proposal that funds projects
in a minority of regions cannot be a CW, as it is defeated by the status quo.
However, with intermediate externalities, all regions may prefer the funding of
projects in a few very low-cost regions to the status quo.
This intuition can be claried by considering the following example. This
example also shows why A3 is required; in the intermediate case we may generally
have no Condorcet winner, even relative to those alternatives that beat the status
quo.
Example 1.
Assume n = 3, and c
2
=3 > e > c
1
=3: It is easy to show that there may be no
Condorcet winner, even if we restrict our attention to the set of those alternatives
that are not beaten by the status quo, Y = fx 2 X jxR0g:
Not counting the status quo, there are seven subsets of N and so seven possible
alternatives in X. However, using assumption A0, f1; 2g is strictly preferred
by 1 and 2 to f1; 3g and f2; 3g. Also, f1g is strictly preferred by 1 and 3 to
{2g, and f1g is strictly preferred by 1 and 2 to {3g. So, we only need consider
K = f1g;M = f1; 2g and N = f1; 2; 3g: Now,
u
K
1
= b
1
 
c
1
3
> 0 (by A0)
u
K
i
= e 
c
1
3
> 0; i = 2; 3
So, x
K
2 Y i.e. it beats the status quo. Also,
u
M
i
= b
i
+ e 
(c
1
+ c
2
)
3
> 0; i = 1; 2 (by A2)
u
M
3
= 2e 
(c
1
+ c
2
)
3
< 0
Again, x
M
2 Y . Also, note that u
K
1
  u
M
1
= u
K
3
  u
M
3
= c
2
=3  e > 0, so x
K
Px
M
.
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Finally,
u
N
i
= b
i
+ 2e 
(c
1
+ c
2
+ c
3
)
3
; i = 1; 2; 3
Also, note that u
M
1
  u
N
1
= u
M
2
  u
N
2
= c
3
=3   e > 0, so x
M
Px
N
. Now assume
that
b
2
; b
3
>

e 
c
1
3

 

2e 
(c
1
+ c
2
+ c
3
)
3

(3.2)
Then, from (3.2), we see that
u
N
i
= b
i
+ 2e 
(c
1
+ c
2
+ c
3
)
3
> e 
c
1
3
= u
K
i
> 0
So, we conclude that x
N
2 Y and that x
N
Px
K
. So, we have a cycle x
K
Px
M
Px
N
Px
K
,
where each alternative in the cycle beats the status quo. We conclude that there
exists no CW in Y , as claimed. k
The example also makes clear however, that the only way that this cycle can
be avoided is by making either b
2
or b
3
less than
 
e 
c
1
3

 

2e 
(c
1
+c
2
+c
3
)
3

. For
then, two out of three delegates would then prefer x
K
to x
N
, and the cycle would
be broken, making x
K
the CW.
In fact, the role of A3 is that it makes exactly this restriction in the general
case. To see this, note that in the example, k = 1,m = 2, and n = 3; so the only
relevant set L is L = N (l > n + k  m implies l > 3   1 = 2, implying l = 3).
Also, if S  L=K and #S = m  k, then we must have S  f2; 3g and #S = 1
implying S = f2g or S = f3g. So, A3 requires that
b
i
+ 2e 
(c
1
+ c
2
+ c
3
)
3
< e 
c
1
3
, i = 2 or 3 (3.3)
which of course is equivalent to the converse of (3.2) for i = 2 or i = 3. It remains
to check that A3 is consistent with A2. It is easy to check that if (3.3) holds for
i = 2, it would violate A2. But A2 does not place any restriction on b
3
, so we can
always choose b
3
so that (3.3) holds.
4. Legislative Rules and Endogenous Agenda Equilibrium
Proposition 1 above makes it clear that unrestricted majority voting over alter-
natives in X in the legislature will lead to voting cycles unless externalities are
11
positive and large enough (e  c
1
=n). So, in order to ensure a determinate out-
come in this case, we need to specify some minimal rules of procedure for the
legislature. Rules of procedure specify how proposals get on the agenda, what
amendments (if any) may be put against them, and when voting takes place.
It turns out that some quite unrestrictive rules lead to a unique equilibrium
outcome. The key rule is that the status quo must be privileged, in the sense that
any amended motion is only passed if it defeats the status quo in a nal round of
voting. This rule is one that is used in the US Congress (Ordeshook(1986)).
The order of events is as follows.
1. Proposals
Any delegate i can propose any motion a
i
2 X as an alternative to the status
quo.
2. Agenda Formation
All the motions made by the delegates are incorporated into an agenda. Mo-
tions proposed by delegates i = 1; ::n are put on the agenda in a random order,
with the nal item on the agenda being the status quo. Formally, a permutation
function  : N ! N is selected randomly from, the set of all such functions, with
probability
11
p

> 0. Given , an agenda is an n+1 tuple y = (y
1
; y
2
; y
j
::y
n
; 0),
where y
i
= a
(i)
.
3. Voting
Voting on the agenda is as follows. The rst and second motions y
1
; y
2
are
voted on, the winner is paired with y
3
, and so on, until nally the winner after
n   1 rounds of pairwise voting (the amended motion) is paired with the status
quo, 0; and there is a nal vote for the amended motion against the status quo. [If
the motion on the oor and the newest amendment get equal numbers of votes,
the tie-breaking rule selects the motion on the oor.]
This procedure is rather general in two senses. First, we allow for endogenous
formation of agendas. Second, the structure of the agenda is very general; the
only restriction is that the items on the agenda are compared pairwise (the agenda
is binary
12
), and the last item is the status quo.
Steps 1-3 above describe an extensive-form game played by the delegates. We
suppose that delegates have Von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over risky
outcomes, and we place the following weak restrictions on strategies: (i) indif-
11
These probabilities need not be equal.
12
An agenda is binary if at every stage, voters vote between two alternatives, alternatives
being subsets of the space of alternatives.
12
ferent voters abstain at all decision nodes in the voting subgame; (ii) weakly
dominated strategies are not played in the voting subgame. Call any subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the above game that satises (i) and (ii) an endogenous
agenda equilibrium.
Building on results by Fiorina, Ferejohn, and McKelvey, we can show that
given assumptions A0-A3, although the endogenous agenda equilibrium is not
unique, there is a unique equilibrium outcome
13
, independent of the ordering of
the proposals : Specically, let
C =

M if e < c
1
=n
K = f1; ::kg if c
k+1
=n > e  c
k
=n, k 2 N
Proposition 4.1. If A0-A3 hold, in any endogenous agenda equilibrium, at least
one i 2 C proposes the motion x
C
. Consequently, whatever  2 , the unique
endogenous agenda equilibrium outcome is x
C
.
This result is essentially a generalization of Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McK-
elvey(1987), in a setting which allows for endogenous agenda formation, as in
McKelvey(1986).
Proposition 2 has the following striking implications. First, the set of projects
undertaken in equilibrium is independent of the local benets b
i
of the projects
(subject to A2 and A3 being satised). This makes precise the idea, expressed
in Oates(1972), that centralization means that decisions are less responsive to
regional preferences.
Second, the proportion of regions obtaining projects,  = c=n depends on the
size of the spillover e; as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 in here.
When e is positive and large enough, we clearly have universal provision of
projects, whereas e is small or negative, we have only provision to a majority.
So, although formally, voting in the legislature is by majority vote (what Inman
and Rubinfeld(1997a) call the minimum winning coalition legislature), the out-
come may be similar to a legislature where there is implicit agreement to provide
universal provision, as in Weingast(1979) and Niou and Ordeshook(1985). How-
ever, in our setting, this arises not though implicit cooperation, but through the
fact that legislative rules allow for (partial) internalization of externalities.
13
Both the equilibrium and the equilibrium outcome are dened formally in the Appendix.
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Note nally that the proportion of projects funded, , is not monotonic in
the size of the externality; when the spillover is of intermediate size, (i.e. in the
range [c
1
=n; c
m
=n)),  actually falls. As remarked above, the intuition is that with
intermediate externalities, all regions may prefer the funding of projects in a few
very low-cost regions to the status quo, whereas when externalities are very low
(or zero) the status quo can only be defeated by a minimum winning coalition.
4.1. Centralization vs. Decentralization
Now that we have characterized the outcome of the political process with cen-
tralization, one way of thinking about the relative merits of centralization and
decentralization is the following. By inspection of (2.3),(2.4), for a single region,
the gain from decentralization can be written;
u
d
i
  u
c
i
(4.1)
= [maxfb
i
  c
i
; 0g   x
C
i
(b
i
  c
i
)] + [
1
n
X
j2C
c
j
  x
C
i
c
i
] + [(d  x
D
i
)  (c  x
C
i
)]
The three terms in (4.1) illustrate the gains from decentralization for each region
in an illuminating way.
First, the term
maxfb
i
  c
i
; 0g   x
C
i
(b
i
  c
i
)  0
reects the eciency gain, due to additional responsiveness to regional project
benets, that comes with decentralized provision.
Second, the term
1
n
X
j2C
c
j
  x
C
i
c
i
is the share of aggregate cost borne by i; minus the true economic cost of i
0
s
project, under centralization. This term captures the distributional impact of
moving to decentralised funding taking as given the set of projects that are funded.
The third term
(d  x
D
i
)  (c  x
C
i
)
measures additional spillovers accruing to i that arise with decentralization. De-
centralization is inecient here in the sense that project externalities are not
internalized at all. Centralization may be more ecient as project externalities
are partially internalized.
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So, we might expect decentralization to be preferred when e is small and/or
regions are heterogenous, and centralization to be preferred when e is large and/or
regions are homogenous. We now turn to a more detailed investigation of this
question.
5. Constitutional Design
At some initial constitutional design stage, regions choose between centraliza-
tion and decentralization. In practice, constitutional (re)design occurs through
the political process, via what Buchanan calls constitutional rules. Depending
on the nature of the constitution, reallocation of tax and spending powers may
be decided upon by ordinary legislation in a national parliament, or may
14
re-
quire formal constitutional amendment, which may in turn, require referenda. In
unitary states, such referenda may be only national, such as the referendum in
the UK to decide on membership of the EU. However, in truly federal states,
constitutional amendment always requires, in some way or other, approval of a
(super)majority the constituent states or regions
15
.
In this model, as all voters in a given region are identical, and all regions
have identical populations, constitutional rules of this type reduce to a simple
regional referendum: regions (or their delegates) vote on the status quo versus the
alternative, and the status quo is selected unless a proportion
16
of at least  of
regions prefer the alternative. We focus on two special cases; ordinary majority
rule ( = 0:5), and unanimity rule ( = 1).
A second dimension of constitutional choice is whether regions can make side-
payments to one another at the constitutional stage. Again, we focus on two
polar cases. One is that they cannot, and the other is that costless and binding
side-payments are possible. In this second case, because payos are linear in
the numeraire good, with unanimity rule, the constitutional arrangement that
maximises the sum of utilities (welfare) will be chosen.
This case is a useful benchmark, as distributional considerations are irrelevant
14
Constitutional amendments are used routinely in Switzerland, and less frequently in the
US, Canada and Australia, to reallocate tax and spending powers (Wheare(1963)).
15
Constitutional amendments in Australia and Switzerland require majority approval of the
population as a whole, and also majorities is all the regions (cantons), but in the US, approval
of a supermajority (3/4) of the states is required (Wheare(1963)).
16
In the event of a tie , we assume that the status quo is selected, which we take w.l.o.g. to
be decentralization:
15
with welfare maximization; the most ecient constitutional arrangement will be
chosen. So, we will consider, in the following order; unanimity with side-payments,
unanimity without side-payments, and majority rule.
Finally, to avoid tedious discussion of non-generic cases, we assume that;
A4: d 6= m 6= n; b
i
6= c
i
; i 2 N
i.e. that the set of projects funded under decentralization is never m or n, and
that no region is indierent about their project. We can now move to an analysis
of the three cases.
5.1. Unanimity Rule with Side-Payments
From (4.1), summing over all regions, we see that the eciency gain from decen-
tralization is
W
d
 W
c
=
X
i2N
[maxfb
i
  c
i
; 0g   x
C
i
(b
i
  c
i
)] + (n  1)(d   c)e (5.1)
Note that in the aggregate, the distributional gains and losses in (4.1) from cost-
pooling net out. So, (5.1) tells us that the eciency gain from decentralization
can be decomposed into two parts. The rst term in (5.1) captures the fact that
decentralization is always more responsive to regional preferences, and is always
non-negative. The second term captures the degree to which decentralization
internalizes the spillover more fully than centralization, and may be positive or
negative.
We then have the following result;
Proposition 5.1. Assume that A0-A4 hold. If there are no spillovers (e = 0),
then decentralization is more ecient (W
d
> W
c
): If spillovers are large enough
(e  c
n
=n); then centralization is more ecient (W
d
< W
c
):
One might conjecture from this result that the gain to centralization would be
everywhere non-decreasing in e: In fact, this is not the case, and is related to the
non-monotonicity of the number of projects in e discussed above. The following
example makes this point.
Example 2
The example has three regions. Assumptions A0-A3 are assumed to hold, and
it is assumed that D = f1g: Also, suppose initially e < c
1
=3, so C = f1; 2g: Then
W
c
 W
d
= b
2
  c
2
+ 2e
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As D = f1g; b
2
  c
2
=  " < 0. Let 2e > "; then W
c
> W
d
i.e. centralization is
strictly more ecient. Now let e increase to e
0
, with c
1
=3  e < c
2
=3. Then, if A3
is satised, C = f1g, so nowW
c
= W
d
: But b
3
can always be chosen to satisfy A3,
as the discussion following Example 1 makes clear. So, in this example,W
c
 W
d
is not everywhere non-decreasing in e:k
As remarked above, one might also conjecture that if regions are homogenous
enough, centralization will be more ecient than decentralization (assuming e 6=
0). In fact, this is not always the case; a centralized government may not select the
right projects even when regions are homogenous, as illustrated by the following
example.
Example 3
The example has three regions. Assumptions A0-A3 are assumed to hold.
Regions are homogenous in the sense that every region has the same project
benet (b
i
= b), and (bearing in mind A1) c
1
> c
3
  " for some small " > 0: Also,
externalities are weakly positive;
c
1
3
> e > 0
So, by Proposition 1, with centralization, projects are undertaken in region 1,2
i.e. C = f1; 2g. Also, assume that b  c
3
. So, with decentralization, all projects
are undertaken i.e. D = f1; 2; 3g: Now note that
W
d
 W
c
= (b
3
  c
3
) + 2e > 0
so that decentralization is clearly more ecient, no matter how small ".k
The reason for this ineciency is that with centralization, there is a cost-
pooling externality discussed above, which (in the absence of a strong positive
project spillover) implies that the minimum winning coalition will form. A
majority group of regions with can reduce their costs by cutting the number of
members of that group with projects, as long as membership exceeds m; even
though it may be inecient to cut these projects.
However, as Proposition 3 indicates, this example relies on externalities being
weakly positive; if the externality is strong enough, centralization is always more
ecient, whether regions are homogenous or not.
5.2. Unanimity Rule
Proposition 3 above shows that when the spillover is zero, decentralization is
strictly more ecient than centralization, but when it is large and positive, the
17
reverse is the case. One might conjecture that there must be some way of choosing
the remaining parameters (the b
i
and c
i
) so that all agents can share in the relevant
eciency gain i.e. so that decentralization is unanimously preferred when the
spillover is zero, and centralization is unanimously preferred when it is large and
positive. Surprisingly, it turns out that only half of this conjecture is true.
Say that the regions are " homogenous if there exists a number " such that


b
i
  b


< "; jc
i
  cj < ", all i 2 N:
where b =
1
n
P
i2N
b
i
, and c =
1
n
P
i2N
c
i
are average benets and costs. We
assume that b 6= c i.e. average net benet from the project is not zero. Note that
this denition of homogeneity is consistent with A1 above. We then have;
Proposition 5.2. Assume A0-A4 hold. If externalities are strongly positive (e >
c
n
=n), then, there exists an  > 0 such that if the regions are " homogenous, with
 > "; then u
c
i
> u
d
i
, i 2 N: But, even if e = 0; then u
c
i
> u
d
i
, some i:
Note rst the striking result that even if there are no spillovers, some region
will strictly gain from centralization, so the choice of decentralization can never
be unanimous. This is because the gain though cost-pooling will always benet
some high-cost region.
Second, we see that with sucient homogeneity across regions, and strongly
positive externalities, centralization is Pareto-preferred. Note, however, that (as
Example 3 makes clear) strongly positive externalities are required; in fact the
combination of strongly positive externalities, plus homogeneity, means that cen-
tralization chooses the ecient set of projects (i.e. N projects in all regions).
5.3. Majority Rule
With majority rule, (de)centralization is selected if (of the regions that are not
indierent) a majority strictly prefer (de)centralization. In this case, it is possible
to nd conditions, on the distribution of costs only
17
, sucient for decentralization
to be chosen when project externalities are zero, and for centralization to be chosen
when externalities are large. Say that the costs are " homogenous if there exists
a number " such that
jc
i
  cj < ", all i 2 N:
where c =
1
n
P
i2N
c. Also, let 
m
be the median benet in the distribution of
benets across regions. We have;
17
Plus a weak lower bound on the median benet.
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Proposition 5.3. Assume A0-A4 hold. If e = 0, and costs are suciently het-
erogenous (c
1
<
1
n
P
m
j=1
c
j
) then majority rule selects decentralization: If e  c
n
=n,

m
> c   (m   1)e; and there is a  > 0 such if costs are " homogenous, with
 > "; then majority rule selects centralization:
For the case of large positive externalities, this result can be contrasted with
Proposition 4: whereas we needed homogeneity in both costs and benets to get
a result about unanimous preference, we need only homogeneity in costs and a
weak condition on the median benet to get a result about majority preference.
6. Some Extensions
6.1. Vote Trading
It is often asserted that legislators have an opportunity for vote trading, that
is, an agreement between two or more legislators for mutual support, even though
it requires each to vote contrary to his real preferences on some legislation (Or-
deshook(1986)). A standard way of modelling vote-trading is to suppose that
legislators can form coalitions to coordinate their strategies. Associated with any
coalition S is a characteristic function i.e. a set of feasible utility vectors for that
coalition. In our model (given the agenda-setting and voting procedure 1-3 de-
scribed in Section 4 above), the set of feasible utility vectors for S is dened as
the set that S can guarantee themselves by coordinating their agenda-setting and
voting behavior. Then, given the characteristic function, the core of the voting
game can be dened, and a point in the core (if the core is non-empty) is an
equilibrium with vote-trading.
Here, the characteristic function v(:) takes a very simple form. If some set S
of voters has #S  m, then this coalition S can propose and vote though any
x 2 X: So, in this case, the members of S can guarantee themselves any feasible
payo. Consequently, the characteristic function is
v(S) = f(v
i
)
i2S
jv
i
 u
i
= u
c
i
(x); some x 2 X; all i 2 Sg
If on the other hand, #S < m, then member i of S can guarantee only u
i
=
min
x2X
u
c
i
(x), so in this case
v(S) = f(v
i
)
i2S
jv
i
 u
i
; all i 2 S g
Say that x

is an equilibrium with vote-trading if there does not exist a coalition
S and a w 2 v(S) such that w
i
 u
c
i
(x

); i 2 S, with at least one strict inequality.
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Note that the set of equilibrium payos with vote-trading comprises the (strong)
core.
The above game is simple majority-rule voting game (Ordeshook(1986)). In
such games it is well-known that the strong core comprises the set of payos from
Condorcet winners. From this, it follows that x

is an equilibrium with vote-trading
i it is a Condorcet winner. So, we have;
Proposition 6.1. Assume that A0-A3 hold. If c
k+1
=n > e  c
k
=n for some
k 2 N; then x
K
; K = f1; 2; ::kg is the unique equilibrium outcome with vote-
trading. If e < c
1
=n, then there exists no equilibrium with vote-trading.
So, in the event that externalities are suciently positive, there is an equilib-
rium with vote-trading. Otherwise, no equilibrium exists.
This proposition has a striking implication. If e  c
1
=n; the outcomewith vote-
trading is exactly the same as with no coordination between legislators. Speci-
cally, coordination does not allow legislators to incorporate the benets of projects
into the political decision-making process. So, Propositions 3,4,5 of the previous
section, concerning the relative eciency of (de)centralization, continue to hold.
6.2. Alternative Models of Legislative Behaviour
We have focussed on the legislativemodel of Fiorina, Ferejohn and McKelvey(1987),
which can be characterized as a two-stage process; rst, a (binary) agenda is
formed, and then voting takes place. The other leading model of legislative be-
haviour is the Baron and Ferejohn(1989) model of legislative bargaining, which
has been applied to public nance issues by Baron(1989), Besley and Coate(1998),
and Persson (1998). There are two problems with using the Baron/Ferejohn model
in this context. First, the innite-horizon model is analytically complex when re-
gions are heterogenous
18
, and perhaps for this reason, Besley and Coate(1998)
and Persson (1998) both use a one-shot version of the model, where each leg-
islator is chosen with probability 1=n to make a proposal which is then voted on
in a pairwise comparison with the status quo, after which the game ends. This
is both restrictive and unrealistic, as it does not allow other legislators to make
amendments to the initial proposal.
A second problem with the Baron/Ferejohn model is that it is possible that
even when a Condorcet winner exists, alternatives other than the CW alternative
18
Baron and Ferejohn(1989) make heavy use of the assumption of identical agents in charac-
terising the (subgame-perfect) equilibrium of the model.
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will be chosen in equilibrium. The reason is that (in the one-shot closed-rule
version of the Baron/Ferejohn model) the legislator who is selected to make a pro-
posal then chooses her proposal to maximise her payo, subject to the constraint
that at least m   1 other legislators also prefer that proposal to the status quo,
and the solution to this constrained maximization problem need not be a CW.
In particular, the proposer may wish to grant herself a project, even though a
majority of other delegates may prefer the proposer not to have a project. The
following example illustrates this point.
Example 4
The example has three regions. Assumptions A0-A2 are assumed to hold.
Suppose that c
2
=3  e < c
3
=3, so that the CW is x
C
= (1; 1; 0): Now suppose
that 3 is chosen as proposer. Let F be the set of projects he decides to fund
19
.
Let b
3
> c
3
=3; then, he will always prefer to fund his own project than not, even
though this makes the other two regions worse o, as c
3
=3 > e. So, 3 chooses
20
between F = f3g; f1; 3g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3g; subject to the constraint that one other
delegate must prefer F to the status quo. It is easily checked that F = f1; 2; 3g is
the solution to this problem as long as b
1
; b
2
> c
3
=3 also.k
In general, however it is possible to show that this divergence between the
CW outcome and the Baron/Ferejohn equilibrium outcome is negligible when n
is large. The reason is that a region not in C can only enforce its will on the others
when that region's delegate is proposer, which occurs with probability 1=n. In
fact, we have:
Proposition 6.2. Assume that e  0 and b
i
 c
i
=n, i 2 N . Then, in the
equilibrium of the Baron/Ferejohn model, any i 2 C receives a project with
probability 1,Moreover, if e  c
m
=n or e < c
1
=n; and any i =2 C receives a project
with probability 1/n.
This result says that for large n, the one-shot version of the Baron/Ferejohn
model gives us an outcome that approximates (in terms of expected payos) the
outcome of the model presented in Section 4 above, except for the parameter
range c
m
=n > e  c
1
=n - which itself becomes negligible as n becomes large: So,
with this qualication, results 3,4,5 will carry over to this alternative model.
19
In the original Baron/Ferejohn model, proposers can also make side-payments to regions.
Howoever, Besley and Coate(1998) use a variant of the Baron/Ferejohn model similar to this
one, where side-payments cannot be made.
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In the original Baron/Ferejohn model, proposers can also make side-payments to regions.
Howoever, Besley and Coate(1998) use a variant of the Baron/Ferejohn model similar to this
one, where sdie-payments cannot be made.
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6.3. Partial Decentralization
We have compared two polar cases of the possible allocation of powers, full de-
centralization and full centralization. However, as mentioned above, there are
two intermediate alternatives which are worthy of mention. The rst, and the
empirically more common case, is where expenditure decisions are decentralized,
but are nanced by a national tax. In this case, the perceived cost of a project
for region i is c
i
=n, so the project will be selected if b
i
 c
i
=n. So, in this case,
the cost spillover, or common pool problem leads to overprovision of projects,
and the outcome is always less ecient than with full decentralization.
The other case is where expenditure decisions are centralized, but are nanced
by regional taxes. In this case, there is no cost-sharing. Without externalities,
all regions j 6= i will be indierent about i
0
s project, and so the outcome under
full decentralization, x
D
, will be a Condorcet winner. Consequently, when e = 0,
the outcome is equivalent to full decentralization. If e > 0, on the other hand,
all j 6= i strictly prefer x
i
= 1, so the alternative where all projects are funded
(x = (1; ::1)) is the unique Condorcet winner. This is of course the uniform
outcome that some have associated with decentralization studied by Oates(1972).
Under some conditions, this outcomemay be more ecient than full centralization
(see for example, Example 3). However, in general, the outcome is insensitive not
only to regional benets (as is full centralization), but also to regional costs (unlike
full centralization). Consequently, there can be no presumption that this form of
partial centralization is generally more ecient than full centralization.
7. Conclusions and Related Literature
This paper has presented a model where the relative merits of centralization and
decentralization, and the performance of various constitutional rules for choosing
between the two, can be evaluated. One key feature of the paper is that (in
the centralized case), we present a fully explicit model of a national legislature,
where legislative rules, rather than behaviour, are taken as primitive. This model
is a generalization of the well-known model of distributive policy to the case
of inter-regional externalities. An important nding is that the uniformity of
provision is endogenously determined by the strength of the externality. When
externalities are large and positive, an outcome closer to universalistic provision,
rather than just a bare majority of funded projects, will occur. Second, there
is likely to be greater consensus on the merits of the equilibrium set of projects
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when externalities are large i.e. a Condorcet winners may emerge. Moreover, this
characterization of the behaviour of the legislature is robust to the introduction
of logrolling, and of dierent specications of the legislative rules.
This model allows to investigate in detail both the relative eciency of and de-
centralization, and of the performance of various constitutional rules for choosing
between them. In general, our analysis conrms Oates' insights that decentral-
ization is preferred when externalities are small and/or regions are heterogenous,
and centralization to be preferred under the reverse conditions. However, there
are some more intriguing ndings, which emerge due to the interaction of the
strength of the externality and legislative behaviour.
For example, while centralization may be welfare-superior to decentralization
when externalities are very large, over some range an increase in the strength
of the externality may make decentralization more attractive. Second, sucient
conditions for a majority of the population to prefer centralization (or decentral-
ization) can be formulated only with reference to the heterogeneity of costs, not
benets.
Some related literature has already been mentioned in the introduction. Here,
we discuss in more detail the two papers that are most closely related to this one.
Ellingsen's paper does provide an explicit model of political decision-making with
centralization. However, his model has only two types of agent, one of which is
more numerous than the other, and direct, rather than representative, democ-
racy. So, with centralization, the more numerous type is eectively a dictator.
Moreover, expenditure is on a pure (national) public good, so the strength of
inter-regional externalities cannot be varied. (Ellingsen does discuss informally
an extension to the case where goods produced by the two jurisdictions are not
perfect substitutes, but does not present any results.) However, his results in
Section 3.2 of his paper (which are comparable to this paper as they assume
homogenous regions) have some of the avour of Propositions 3-5 above.
The work much the closest to this one is the independent work of Besley and
Coate(1998), which addresses the same issue - the choice between centralized and
decentralised provision of regional public goods - in a political economy model.
However, this paper and theirs are really complementary in the way that they view
centralization. First, Besley and Coate(1998) focus on the role of strategic voting
for delegates to the legislature. Specically, in their model, populations in regions
are heterogenous, and any citizen may stand a candidate for election. So, voting
in a delegate with a strong preference for public spending is a precommitment
mechanism that allows that region to capture more of the available tax revenue
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for its own projects. This is a source of ineciency with centralized provision. We
abstract from this important issue in our model, by assuming that the population
within any region is homogenous.
The second key dierence is that Besley and Coate do not model all the rules
of operation of the legislature explicitly. Specically, they assume that each of
the two delegates to the legislature (there are only two regions in their model) is
selected with equal probability to be agenda-setter, and then the agenda-setter
maximises the sum of his own payo and the weighted payo of the other delegate,
where the weight  is exogenously xed at some value between zero and one
21
.
By contrast, in this paper, we study a model where all the rules of operation of
the legislature are explicit (and quite general). This really makes a dierence; one
of the key insights of our model is that the degree to which policy is universal-
istic rather than majoritairian (i.e.e the proportion of regions that get projects)
depends crucially on the level of the project externality; the higher this is, the
closer provision is to universalistic. This suggests that the comparative static
exercises of Besley and Coate, where the size of the externality and the weight 
are varied independently. may not be consistent with a micro-founded model
of the legislature
22
.
Perhaps because we do not model the possibility of strategic voting or dele-
gates, (and because projects are discrete rather than continuous), our model is
also more general in some other important respects, while remaining analytically
tractable. We have an arbitrary number of regions (where Besley and Coate have
two), and can obtain analytical results for the case where regions dier in both
project benets and costs (in Besley and Coate, the two regions have the same
costs, and most analytical results are obtained only for the case where the two
regions also have the same benets).
21
This weight is a proxy for the outcome of a dynamic model of legislative bargaining, where
implicit cooperation is possible.
22
This key dierence is reected also in the results. For example, Besley and Coate nd that
the gain from centralisation is monotonically increasing in the size of the project externality
(Proposition 2(i)), whereas from Example 2 above, we do not.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Endogenous Agenda Equilibrium
Here, we dene formally and characterise the endogenous agenda equilibrium.
First, it is possible to obtain the following characterization of the voting subgame:
Lemma A.1. Under restrictions (i) and (ii) in the text, the subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcome of the voting subgame is unique, and equal to y

1
, where y

i
is recursively dened as follows, with y

n+1
= 0:
y

i
=

y
i
if y
i
Ry

j
, 8j > i
y

i+1
otherwise
for i = 1; ::n  1 (A.1)
Proof of Lemma 8
Given the restrictions on strategies stated in the Lemma, and the fact that
at any node, there only two alternatives, it is easy to check that (given unique
continuation payos), the unique equilibrium strategy for a non-indierent voter
is to vote sincerely i.e. for his most preferred alternative. Also, in the event of a
tie, the tie-breaking rule gives a unique outcome. It now follows by a backward
induction argument that there exists a unique SPE in this voting subgame. More-
over, the outcome must be described as in the Lemma, by backward induction.

In the voting literature, y

i
is known as the sophisticated equivalent of y
i
.
So, (A.1) says that if y
i
cannot be beaten by all the sophisticated equivalents
of proposals further down the agenda (including the status quo), y
i
is its own
sophisticated equivalent:
Thus, conditional on y; this subgame generates a unique outcome, implying
that a map from an agenda y to the outcome, y

1
= z(y) can be constructed. Also,
let y(a; ) be the unique map from a vector of motions a = (a
1
; :a
n
) to an agenda
y given a permutation : So, the map from a vector of motions a to an outcome
is
y

1
= z(y(a; )) = (a; )
Consequently, given this map, we may then write utility of agents over proposed
agendas as
u
i
(a
1
; ::a
n
; )  u
c
i
((a
1
; ::a
n
; ))
So, we can dene
v
i
(a
1
; ::a
n
) =
X
2
p

u
i
(a
1
; ::a
n
; ) (A.2)
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We can now formally dene:
Denition. An endogenous agenda equilibrium is an n-tuple (a

1
; :::a

n
), such that
v
i
(a

i
; ::a

 i
)  v
i
(a
0
i
; ::a

 i
), all a
0
i
2 A:
Denition. An x

2 X is an outcome of an endogenous agenda equilibrium
conditional on  if x

= (a

1
; :::a

n
; ), where (a

1
; :::a

n
) is an endogenous agenda
equilibrium.
A.2. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) For any K  N , dene v(K) as
v(K) = ke 
1
n
X
j2K
c
j
Also, dene
w(j) = ej  
1
n
j
X
i=1
c
i
So, v(K)  w(k), with equality i K = f1; ::kg. Consequently, if
c
j+1
n
> e 
c
j
n
() w(j)  w(l), l 6= j
with w(j) > w(l) unless e = c
j
=n; in which case w(j) = w(j   1). Also, note that
if l > k > j, or l < k < j; then w(k) > w(l): These two properties say that w(l)
is quasi-concave in l with a maximizer of j (which is unique unless e = c
j
=n; in
which case j  1 is also a maximizer). Finally, note that if e < c
1
=n, w(j) < 0, all
j 2 N:
Now let K;L  N be two sets, with K = f1; ::kg so it comprises the k lowest-
cost regions, and L arbitrary. Let A = K \ L, B = K [ L. Using the above
results, we see that following a switch from x
L
to x
K
, we have the following gains
for all i 2 (N=L) [K = S;
u
c
i
(x
K
)  u
c
i
(x
L
) = v(K)  v(L)  w(k)  w(l), i 2 N=B (A.3)
u
c
i
(x
K
)  u
c
i
(x
L
) = [b
i
  e+ v(K)]  v(L) > w(k)  w(l); i 2 K=A
u
c
i
(x
K
)  u
c
i
(x
L
) = [b
i
  e+ v(K)]  [b
i
  e+ v(L)]  w(k)  w(l), i 2 A
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(ii) Now let c
k+1
=n > e  c
k
=n; k  m. We will show that x
K
Px
L
, implying
that x
K
is the unique CW. Note rst that as k  m, then #S = s  m. Then,we
see from (A.3) that
u
c
i
(x
K
)  u
c
i
(x
L
)  w(k)  w(l), i 2 S (A.4)
Now from the properties of w(:); if e > c
k
=n, and/or l 6= j   1; then w(k) > w(l).
Consequently, from (A.8), u
c
i
(x
K
) > u
c
i
(x
L
); i 2 S and consequently x
K
Py, all
y 2 X
n
.
If e > c
k
=n, and l = j   1, then there are two cases. First, if L 6= f1; ::j   1g,
v(L) > w(l), implying that
v(K)  v(L) > w(k)  w(l)
Consequently, all the inequalities in (A.3) hold strictly, and so again u
c
i
(x
K
) >
u
c
i
(x
L
); i 2 S and consequently x
K
Py, all y 2 X. Finally, if L = f1; ::j   1g, then
it is easy to check that all delegates are indierent between x
K
and x
L
except for
j, who strictly prefers x
K
. Again, x
K
Py, all y 2 X:
(iii) Now let c
k+1
=n > e  c
k
=n; k < m. Again, we show that x
K
Px
L
. If
s  m, then the argument is as above. However, as k < m, it is now possible that
s < m. This can occur i l > n+ k  m.
So, it is sucient to show that x
K
Px
L
for all L  N with l > n+ k  m. In
turn, to show that x
K
Px
L
in this case, it is certainly sucient to show that m k
of delegates i 2 N=S strictly prefer x
K
to x
L
; for then, m  k + s  m delegates
overall strictly prefer x
K
to x
L
. Now,
u
c
i
(x
K
)  u
c
i
(x
L
) =  (b
i
  e) + v(K)  v(L); i 2 N=S
So, A4 implies directly that u
c
i
(x
K
) > u
c
i
(x
L
) for m   k delegates in N=S, as
required.
(iv) Now consider the case with e < c
1
=n. We rst show that x
M
is a Condorcet
winner in Y = fx 2 X jxR0g: First, 0 2 Y by denition, and by assumption A1,
x
M
R0:
Next, assuming x
L
6= 0, if x
L
R0, it must be the case that #L = l  m.
First we show that delegates i 2 N=L always prefer 0 to x
L
: To see this, note
that following a switch from 0 to x
L
; regions i 2 N=L have a net gain of at most
w(l) < 0 in external benet. So, regions i 2 N=L always lose from the switch.
Now if #L < m; delegates i 2 N=L are in the majority, implying 0Px
L
.
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So, let L  N be such that #L = l  m. It is then sucient to show that x
M
is preferred to any x
L
. But, from the argument in (ii),
u
c
i
(x
M
)  u
c
i
(x
L
)  w(m) w(l), i 2 S
Now, from the properties of w(:); w(m) > w(l): So, all i 2 S prefer x
M
to x
L
; and
as #S  m, it follows that x
M
Rx
L
.
Finally, we need to show that there does not exist a Condorcet winner overall.
To do this, in view of (ii), we only need show that (a) x
M
is not a CW in X; (b)
no z 2 X=Y is a CW in X.
The proof of (a) is simple. Let x
f1g
, i 2 M; be the proposal which only
funds the project in 1. Then obviously, the delegate from region 1 prefers x
f1g
.
Moreover, as w(1) > w(m), all i 2 N=M also prefer x
f1g
. As these delegates
constitute a majority, so x
f1g
Rx
M
, implying that x
M
is not a CW in X:
Also, (b) follows immediately from the fact that if z 2 X=Y , z is beaten by
the status quo 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Note from (4.1) that if an agenda y contains x
C
, then the sophisticated equiva-
lent of y
1
must be x
C
: this is because from Proposition 1, x
C
beats both the status
quo and anything that beats the status quo (See Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McK-
elvey(1987)). So, x
C
= z(y); and the map from a vector of proposals a = (a
1
; :a
n
)
to an outcome is x

1
= (a; ) = x
C
i a contains x
C
:
(iii) We now claim that in any endogenous agenda equilibrium, (a

1
; :::a

n
) must
contain x
C
. For suppose not: then the outcome must be some x
0
2 Y = fx 2
X jxR0g. But for some i 2 M , u
i
(x
C
) > u
i
(x
0
) [otherwise, i 2 C, u
i
(x
C
) <
u
i
(x
0
); all i 2 M; which contradicts the denition of x
C
as a CW in Y ]: So, by
proposing x
C
, some i 2 C can do strictly better than u
i
(x
0
).
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) When e = 0, c = m so from A4, c 6= d. Then, as c 6= d; we have
X
i2N
[maxfb
i
  c
i
; 0g   x
C
i
(b
i
  c
i
)] > 0
so (i) follows immediately from (5.1).
(ii) To prove (ii), note that we can write
W
c
=
X
i2C
(b
i
  e+ ne  c
i
)
W
d
=
X
i2D
(b
i
  e+ ne  c
i
)
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Now, for e  c
n
=n, C = N , so
W
c
 W
d
=
X
i2N=D
(b
i
  e+ ne  c
i
)
where N=D is non-empty from A4. As e  c
n
=n, and from A0; b
i
 e+ne c
i
> 0
all i 2 N , so W
c
> W
d
as claimed. 
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) First, if e = 0; all i not in C strictly prefer decentralization, as they no
longer pay a share of other regions' costs, and only undertake their own project
if the benet is non-negative.
So, we focus on i 2 C: From Proposition 1; C = M as e = 0, so i 2 C=D =
M=D only get a project with centralization. So, by A2, all i 2 M=D strictly
prefer centralization: So, the only way in which decentralization could be Pareto-
preferred is if M=D = ;, i.e. if M  D. But then
u
d
m
= b
m
  c
m
< b
m
 
1
m
m
X
j=1
c
j
< b
m
 
1
n
m
X
j=1
c
j
= u
c
m
i.e. the agent with the median cost strictly prefers centralization.
(ii) As D = fi 2 N jb
i
 c
i
g, then for " small enough, recalling b 6= c we see
D =

N if b > c
; if b < c
So, for " small enough,
u
d
i
=

b
i
  c
i
+ (n  1)e if b > c
0 if b < c
Also, as c
i
! c, e > c=n implies e > c
n
=n for " small enough. So, from Proposition
1, e > c=n implies C = N: So, for " small enough
u
c
i
= b
i
  c
i
+ (n  1)e
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Now, by A4, d 6= n so we are in the case where b < c. So, to show u
c
i
> u
d
i
, i 2 N ,
we only need show that b
i
  c
i
+ (n  1)e > 0. Now note that for " small enough,
A
i
= b
i
 
1
n
X
j2M
c
j
+ (m  1)e (A.5)
< b
i
 
m
n
c
i
+ (m  1)e+ " (A.6)
= b
i
  c
i
+ (n  1)e  (n m)(e 
c
i
n
) + " (A.7)
Also, from A2, we must have A
i
> 0. So, from (A.5), for " < (n m)(e 
c
i
n
); we
have
b
i
  c
i
+ (n   1)e > 0
as required. 
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) When e = 0, clearly all i not in C strictly prefer decentralization, as
maxfb
i
  c
i
; 0g >  
1
n
P
j2C
c
j
. As #C = m, it suces to nd only one i 2 C
who strictly prefers decentralization also, and we are done. Now note that by
denition, 1 2 C. So, combining this fact with c
1
<
1
n
P
m
j=1
c
j
we see
u
d
1
 b
1
  c
1
> u
c
1
= b
i
 
1
n
m
X
j=1
c
j
So, 1 is the required region.
(ii) If e  c
n
=n, then
u
c
i
= b
i
  c+ (n  1)e
u
d
i
= maxfb
i
  c
i
; 0g + (d  x
D
i
)e
By A4, d 6= n 6= m. Assume rst that n > dm. Now, as jc
i
  cj < ", if we choose
" < e(n  d); then
u
c
i
> b
i
  c
i
+ (n  1)e  "
> b
i
  c
i
+ (d  1)e
= u
d
i
for all i 2 D: So, a majority strictly prefer C:
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Now suppose that d < m. Then for all i 2 D; we can show that u
c
i
> u
d
i
as
before. Also, by denition of 
m
we can nd m d members of N=D with b
i
 
m
.
Let the set of such members be S.
u
c
i
> b
i
  c+ (n  1)e  "
= b
i
  c+ (n  1  d)e+ de  "
 b
i
  c+ (m  1)e+ de  "
 
m
  c+ (m  1)e+ de  ", i 2 S
But by assumption, 
m
  c+(m  1)e > 0. So, for " small enough, u
c
i
> u
d
i
= de,
i 2 S. But then overall, a strict majority of regions prefer centralization. 
Proof of Proposition 7
By assumptions b
i
 c
i
=n and e  0; if any i is agenda-setter, he will always
prefer to give a project to his own region. Let A
i
be the set of coalition members
that i chooses when he is selected as proposer i.e. every j 2 A
i
prefers i
0
s proposal
to the status quo. Let S = A
i
[ fig: Then A
i
must solve problem P, which is
max
A
i
N
b
i
 
1
n
X
j2S
c
j
+ (#S   1)e
s:t: x
S
j
b
j
 
1
n
X
j2S
c
j
+ (#S   x
S
j
)e  0; j 2 A
i
(A.8)
#S  m  1 (A.9)
There are then three cases.
(i) e < c
1
=n: Here, i can induce any j to vote for x
S
only by oering j a project,
as without a project j always prefers the status quo ( 
1
n
P
j2S
c
j
+ #Se < 0, all
S  N): So, i will oer exactly m   1 other regions projects, and clearly these
will be the ones with the lowest cost i.e. A
i
= f1; ::m  1g. By A2, f1; ::m  1g
is feasible in P, and by the above argument, it clearly solves P.
(ii)c
k
=n  e < c
k+1
=n; k < m: In this case, ignoring the constraints (A.8),(A.9),
i would prefer to set A
i
= K = f1; :::kg (or K=fig if i 2 K): Let h > k be the
largest integer such that
 
1
n
X
j2K[fhg
c
j
+ (k + 1)e  0
If i 2 H = f1; ::hg; then if i oers projects to regions in K, as well as a project in
its own region, then every region gets a non-negative payo from x
S
, S = K [fig,
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and thus A
i
= K is feasible in P. If i > h, A
i
= K is not feasible in P (i.e.
externalities are not strong enough to induce regions who do not get projects to
vote for x
S
; S = K [ fig) and so i must oer projects to the minimum winning
coalition i.e. set A
i
= f1; ::m  1g.
(iii) c
k
=n  e < c
k+1
=n; k  m: Here, S = K [ fig, by the previous argument:
By the above arguments, it is clear that whatever e, projects in C are funded
with probability one. Moreover, if c
1
=n  e or c
m
=n  e, projects not in C are
funded with probability 1=n only. 
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